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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES
UTAH STATUTE
It is unlawful in the State of Utah to drive or be in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle. Such conduct is prohibited by U.C.A. 41-6a-502 which provides:

41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a
combination of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration.
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
.08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of
safely operating a vehicle; or
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at
the time of operation or actual physical control.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
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U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2) defines a prior conviction referencing an out-of-state DUI
in subsection viii. It provides:
(viii) statutes or ordinances previously in effect in this state or in effect in
any other state, the United States, or any district, possession, or territory of
the United States which would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or
alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving if
committed in this state, including punishments administered under 10
U.S.C.Sec.815.

CALIFORNIA STATUTE
California convictions would be based on a violation of their motor vehicle
code section 23152 which provides:

(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the
influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined
influence of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle.
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight,
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.
For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent,
By weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams
of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol
per 210 liters of breath

In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable
presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight,
of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the
person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours
after the driving

(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the
use of any drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall
not apply to a person who is participating in a narcotic treatment
program approved pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 11875)
of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and
Safety Code

(d) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.04 percent or more, by weight,
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a commercial motor vehicle, as defined
in Section 15210.
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah
Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Appellant challenges the trial court rulings where the trial court allowed
California convictions (two) to be used for the purpose enhancing a class B
misdemeanor to a third degree felony. Appellant argues the two California
convictions do not meet the mandates under Utah law for purpose of enhancement
as required under U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2).
The trial court found the California statute to be broader than the Utah
statute; however denied the appellant's motion. To be used to enhance a
misdemeanor to a felony, the Utah statute requires that the prior offense would
constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of
both-related reckless driving if committed in this state

STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant entered a 'Sery' plea of guilty preserving his right to appeal the trial
court's denial of his motion to dismiss the third degree felony. The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss but allowed the 'Sery" plea to be entered.
FACTUAL STATEMENT
No evidence was taken in support of the defendant's motion to dismiss. The
ruling of the trial court was based on the motions of the parties and oral argument
only. The State produced no evidence to support their conclusion that the California
convictions met the requirements of U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2).
The parties submitted a stipulated order was submitted to the trial court
which was then approved. The order provided the following:
Defendant has challenged the current charge as a felony. Defendant
asserts that prior convictions from the State of California do not qualify under
the enhancement statute of the State of Utah. Section U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2)
defines what constitutes a prior offense for purpose of enhancing a Dill to a
felony categorization.
The prior offenses arise out of the State of California. There is no assertion
by the State that the defendant's offenses in California would qualify for a
conviction in the State of Utah.
The convictions are based on the California motor vehicle code, section
23152. It provides:
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the
influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence
of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle.
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of
alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.
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For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent,
By weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams
of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol
per 210 liters of breath.

The California statute allows a conviction to be obtained if the
blood/alcohol test indicates an alcohol level exceeding 0.08 within three hours
after driving.
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable
presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight,
of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the
person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours
after the driving.
It also makes it unlawful for a person addicted to the use of any drug to
drive a motor vehicle.
(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the
use of any drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall
not apply to a person who is participating in a narcotic treatment
program approved pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section
11875) of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and
Safety Code.
Further, the conviction can be obtained if the blood alcohol level is 0.04 and
the accused is driving a commercial vehicle.
(d) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of
alcohol in his or her blood to drive a commercial motor vehicle, as defined in
Section 15210.
The provision allowing a conviction for a blood alcohol level above 0.04
within three hours is also present
The Court concludes the California statute is broader than the Utah
statute.
The companion statute under which the defendant is accused is U.C.A.
41-6a-502. It provides:
41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination
of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration.

(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater at the time of the test;
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle; or
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of. 08 grams or greater at the
time of operation or actual physical control.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
A Utah defendant is only subject to a felony enhancement if the prior
convictions meet the definition set out by section U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2). See
U.C.A. 41-6a-503(2)(b). U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2) defines a prior conviction
referencing an out-of-state DUI in subsection viii. It provides:
(viii) statutes or ordinances previously in effect in this state or in effect in any
other state, the United States, or any district, possession, or territory of the
United States which would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or
alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving if
committed in this state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C.
Sec..
The provisions of the California act do not parrot the Utah provisions
of U.C.A. 41-6a-502. Convictions can be made out under the California laws
which are not authorized under U.C.A. 41-6a-502. A conviction can exists if
within three hours post-driving, the defendant had a blood alcohol level
exceeding or equaling 0.08 in the case of passenger vehicles and 0.04 if a
commercial vehicle was utilized. The offense can be made out if the accused
was a drug addicted person and drove a vehicle. Further, the Utah act
requires to be a controlled substance. California is not so limited.
CONCLUSION
Although the California statute is broader than the Utah statute, the
Court denies the defendant's motion to strike the felony categorization.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence did not justify an enhancement of this misdemeanor offense to
a felony status. The trial court found the California statute to be broader than the
Utah statute. A conviction can thereby be obtained under the California statute when
not justified by the Utah statute. Section 41-6a-501(2) requires the California
conduct constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or alcohol, any drug, or a
combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this state.
No evidence was produced to justify such a conclusion.

DETAILED ARGUMENT
The language used in U.C.A. 41-6a-501(2)(a) expresses a legislative
limitation or restriction on the use of out-of-state convictions. The State has to prove
an out-of-state conviction would constitute a violation of U.C.A. 41-6a-502. No facts
were introduced to justify such a conclusion.
When comparing the statutes, Courts have presumed that the prior
conviction does not necessarily fall within the proscription of the Utah statute. Courts
have presumed the least offense punishable under the foreign law (California).
People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150
Enhancement is only permissible when the conduct underlying the foreign
conviction would meet all of the elements of the Utah offense. People v. Guerrero

(1988) 44 Cal.3d 343 [243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150; State v.Brooks. 968
S.W.2d [312,] 313-14 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1997); State v. Reynolds.264 Conn. 1
(2003); U.C.A. 41-6a-502; State v.Brooks. 968 S.W.2d [312,] 313-1 (Tenn.Crim.App.
1997).
See also Seguna v. Maketa, 181 P.3d 399 (Colo.App. 2008) finding a
felony conviction in Michigan did not disqualify the petitioners request for a weapons
permit; the Michigan offense did not qualify under the Colorado statutory scheme
prohibiting the permit.
A offense in one state may not presumptively qualify as a conviction in
another state. The Arizona Court held that foreign conviction must meets specifically
the Arizona offenses set out by their statutory scheme. State v. Kuntz, 209 Ariz. 276
(App. 2004), 100 P.3d 26,437. The Court compared the elements of the Minnesota
statue to the Arizona sex offender statute and concluded that Kuntz's conviction
under M.S. § 609.344 did not necessarily prove that if he had committed the offense
in Arizona he would have violated A.R.S. § 13-1406(A). The Minnesota conviction
must have match identically to the Arizona statue and must exclude the possibility of
conviction under Arizona law.

First, if Kuntz was convicted of violating subsections (a),
(b), or (d) of§ 609.344, which are not dependent on the victim's
lack of consent, he would not have violated § 13-1406(A), which is
dependent on the victim's lack of consent. Second, unlike the
1981 version of §13-1406(A), § 609.344 did not require proof that
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the victim was not the defendant's spouse. Third, and finally,
assuming the Minnesota court convicted Kuntz of violating
subsection (c) of§ 609.344, because the meaning of "force" under
that provision is broader than the meaning of the term "without
consent" as used in § 13-1406(A), conviction under the former
does not necessarily prove the elements of the latter. Specifically,
Minnesota defined "force" to include the "commission or threat of
any other crime by the actor against the complainant or another,"
while Arizona limited "without consent" to mean "coerced by the
immediate use or threatened use of force." See M.S. § 609.341(3)
(1980); A.R. S. § 13-1401(5) (1978). Thus, it was possible to use
"force" under M.S. § 609.344 by committing or threatening to
commit a crime not involving the use or threat of physical force,
such as extortion.
Because it was possible for Kuntz to violate M.S. § 609.344 and not also
violate A.R.S. § 13-1406(A), they decided that he was not required to register as a
sex offender under A.R.S. § 13-3821 (A).
In State v.Schaaf. 169 Ariz. 323, 333,819 P.2d 909, 919 (1991), the
supreme court reviewed the aggravating circumstance for use in imposing the death
penalty — whether "[t]he defendant was previously convicted of a felony in the
United States involving the use or threat of violence on another person." The
defendant in Schaaf contended that his prior Nevada convictions for attempted
murder with a deadly weapon did not qualify as aggravating circumstances under
this provision because attempted murder is a non-violent crime in Nevada. 169 Ariz,
at 333, 819 P.2d at 919. The Court held the State was required to show that the
particular offense must have excluded that it could "be perpetrated only with the use
or threat of violence." Id. at 333-34, 819 P.2d at 919-20.

In State v. Clouqh
, 171 Ariz. 217, 219-20, 829 P.2d 1263,1265-66 (App. 1992) held that strict
conformity was required between elements of foreign offense and Arizona offense
before sentence enhancement under A.R.S. § 13-604(1) (1989) could apply.
The California Court of Appeals considered whether a Colorado DUl statute
was sufficient to enhance a California DUl to a felony. People v. Crane. 142 Cal.
App.4th 425, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 334, 340 (2006). In California, as in Utah, a foreign
conviction could be used for enhancement purposes only if it could be a conviction if
committed there. Cal. Veh. Code § 23626.
The court first looked to Colorado's statute to determine whether it satisfied
all of the elements of section 23152. Crane's Colorado conviction was for driving
while ability-impaired. Crane, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at, 336. This statute prohibited
driving a motor vehicle when the person was "affected to the slightest degree." Id. at
338. However, California's DUl statute considered a person to be under the influence
when a person was impaired to an appreciable degree. People v. Enriquez,
42 Cal. App. 4th 661, 665 (Cal.Ct. App., 1996).

The Court determined that a standard of being affected to the slightest
degree was not high enough to render the conduct in Colorado a violation of
California's statute requiring an appreciable degree of impairment, regardless of
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Crane's blood alcohol levels. Crane at 340. The Utah statute requires that the
defendant was incapable of driving the vehicle safely as opposed to California which
requires a significantly less impact. U.C.A. 41-6a-502.
In another case, the Federal Fourth Circuit compared Maryland and
Virginia statutes for enhancement purposes and determined that a prior Maryland
conviction could not be used for enhancement purposes in Virginia. United States v.
Thomas, 367 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2004). They found the Virginia statute provided for
use of foreign convictions to enhance a charge only if the statute on which the
previous conviction is based was substantially similar to Virginia Code § 18.2-266.
Thomas, 367 F.3d at 197.
In Virginia, a person could be guilty of DUI for driving or operating a motor
vehicle either with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 or more, or while
under the influence of alcohol. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266 (2004). A test result of 0.08
or more created a rebuttable presumption that the person had such concentration
while driving and was under the influence while driving. Thomas, 367 F.3d at 198.
While Maryland prohibited driving under the influence of alcohol and
driving under the influence of alcohol per se. Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-902(a)
(2003). Driving under the influence of alcohol per se occurred when a person
showed a BAC of 0.08 or more at the time of testing. M.C.A. § 11 -127.1 (a) (2002).
This alternative for conviction did not create a rebuttable presumption that the person

was in fact driving under the influence of alcohol, but rather gave rise to an
independent conviction merely for having a BAC of 0.08 or more. Thomas, 367 F.3d
at 198.
A Virginia conviction for driving under the influence per se would not be a
conviction in Maryland (rebuttable presumption). Since Maryland's per se violation
did not provide for a rebuttable presumption based on the blood alcohol
concentration, the Maryland statute was deemed not to be substantially similar to the
Virginia statute. Id. See also State v. Talbert, 622 N.W.2d 297 (Iowa 2007).
California provides a rebuttable presumption while Utah does not.

CALIFORNIA STATUTE
California convictions would be based on a violation of their motor vehicle
code section 23152 which provides:

(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the
influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined
influence of any alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle.
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight,
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.
For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent,
By weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams
of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol
per 210 liters of breath.
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The California statute allows a conviction to be obtained if the blood/alcohol
test indicates an alcohol level exceeding 0.08 within three hours after driving.

In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable
presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight,
of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the
person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three hours
after the driving.
It also makes it unlawful for a person addicted to the use of any drug to
drive a motor vehicle.

(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the
use of any drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall
not apply to a person who is participating in a narcotic treatment
program approved pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section
11875) of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and
Safety Code.

Further, the conviction can be obtained if the blood alcohol level is 0.04 and
the accused is driving a commercial vehicle.

(d) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.04 percent or more, by weight,
of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a commercial motor vehicle, as
defined in Section 15210.

The provision allowing a conviction for a blood alcohol level above 0.04
within three hours is also present.
For a defendant to be in violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 23152(a), the alcohol
or drug "must have so far affected the nervous system, the brain, or muscles of the
individual as to impair to an appreciable degree the ability to operate a vehicle in a
manner like that of an ordinarily prudent and cautious person in full possession of his
faculties." People v. Enriquez, 42 Cal. App. 4th 661, 665 (Cal.Ct.App., 1996).

UTAH STATUTE
It is unlawful in the State of Utah to drive or be in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle. Such conduct is prohibited by U.C.A. 41-6a-502 which provides:

41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a
combination of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration.
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
.08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of
safely operating a vehicle; or
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at
the time of operation or actual physical control.
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(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

As compared to the California statute, the Utah statute has no rebuttable
presumption. California M.V.A 23152 . Under Utah law, a person may be considered
to be driving under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders him/her
'incapable to safely operate' a motor vehicle. This is compare to California which
requires a lesser standard of only an 'appreciable degree of impairment'. People v.
Enriquez, 42 Cal. App. 4th 661, 665 (Cal.Ct.App., 1996).

DATED this 22nd day of February, 2010.
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Addendum to Brief

1. Court's Ruling.
2. California statute.

California Code
CALIFORNIA VEHICLE CODE
DIVISION 11. RULES OF THE ROAD
Chapter 12. Public Offenses
Article 2. Offenses Involving Alcohol and Drugs

§ 23152 Veh.
[EDITORS' NOTE: SEE BELOW FOR ADDITIONAL VERSION.]
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of any
alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence of any
alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle.
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by
weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.
For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent, by
weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath.
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable

presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of
alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the
person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three
hours after the driving.
(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the use of any
drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall not apply to a
person who is participating in a narcotic treatment program approved
pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 11875)
of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and Safety Code.
(d) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.04 percent or more, by
weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a commercial motor
vehicle, as defined in Section 15210.
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable
presumption that the person had 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of
alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the
person had 0.04 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three
hours after the driving.
(e) This section shall become operative on January 1,1992, and
shall remain operative until the director determines that federal
regulations adopted pursuant to the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1986 (49 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.) contained in Section
383.51 or 391.15 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations do
not require the state to prohibit operation of commercial vehicles
when the operator has a concentration of alcohol in his or her blood
of 0.04 percent by weight or more.
(f) The director shall submit a notice of the determination under
subdivision (e) to the Secretary of State, and this section shall be
repealed upon the receipt of that notice by the Secretary of State.
(Amended (as amended by Stats. 1992, Ch. 974, sec. 16) by
Stats. 1995, Ch. 455, sec. 31. Effective September 5,1995.)

§23152

[EDITORS' NOTE: SEE ABOVE FOR ADDITIONAL VERSION.]
(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of any
alcoholic beverage or drug, or under the combined influence of any
alcoholic beverage and drug, to drive a vehicle.
(b) It is unlawful for any person who has 0.08 percent or more, by
weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.
For purposes of this article and Section 34501.16, percent, by
weight, of alcohol in a person's blood is based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath.
In any prosecution under this subdivision, it is a rebuttable
presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of
alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the vehicle if the
person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her
blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test within three
hours after the driving.
(c) It is unlawful for any person who is addicted to the use of any
drug to drive a vehicle. This subdivision shall not apply to a
person who is participating in a narcotic treatment program approved
pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 11875)
of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and Safety Code.
(d) This section shall become operative only upon the receipt by
the Secretary of State of the notice specified in subdivision (f) of
Section 23152, as added by Section 25 of Chapter 1114 of the Statutes
of 1989.
(Amended (as amended by Stats. 1992, Ch. 974, sec. 17) by
Stats. 1995, Ch. 455, sec. 32. Effective September 5,1995.)

